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Abstract: 
In recent times one major evolution in several  industrial  districts in Italy has been emergence  of new hierarchical 
structures that led to the rise of lead firms. These are firms that – contrary to canonical district firms which tend to 
remain small – pursue size grow, invest in marketing, distribution and R&D, reorganize their subcontracting networks, 
and  become  international  by  establishing  commercial  subsidiaries  and  production  facilities  abroad.  However,  lead 
firms’ histories remain largely unexplored. This article contributes to fill this gap by examining the case of one of such 
lead firms: Wam, a company set up in 1968 in the mechanical engineering district of Modena, which at the beginning of 
the 21
st century had become the world leader in the production of bulk material handling and dust filtration machinery. 
The article in particular focuses on the strategy of growth and internationalization that this company has pursued and its 
effects in both the host nations and in its Italian ID of origin.
JEL Classification: N24, P12, C632
One key element of Italy’s good economic performance since the 1960s has been the success of
those  production  systems  that  economists call “industrial  districts” [henceforth  IDs].  These  are 
clusters of small firms that exploit external economies of scale and economies of specialization 
generated by the division of labor between firms and flexible production organization within them.
1
This peculiar model of economic development was considered as the natural evolution of Italy’s
industrial  history  after  the 1970s,  when  both  the  private  and  the  state-owned  big  business 
experienced a long lasting crisis.
2 However, in the 1990s competition from low wage countries and 
large firm restructuring forced IDs to compete almost exclusively in quality-conscious markets. At 
the same time, changes in demand composition, a need for a higher intrinsic production quality, 
shorter delivery times and a more active product commercialization prompted a restructuring of the 
organizational framework of several Italian IDs with the emergence of new hierarchical structures 
(holdings, groups, formalized networks) that led to the rise of lead firms.
3
Lead firms are companies that – contrary to “canonical” district firms which tended to remain 
“small” – pursue  size growth, offer  a  wide  range  of  products  and  extend  their  markets,  often 
acquiring other firms both within and outside their ID of origin. Lead firms introduce complex 
innovation  that  results  in  fundamental  changes  in  the  entrepreneurial  formula  and  in  the 
organizational model of the firm. At the same time, such innovation requires a high level of formal 
knowledge  (transferable  and,  therefore,  available  to  the  firm  outside  the  ID)  that  can  be 
contextualized inside the firm.
4
Since the 1990s lead firms tended to play a paramount role in orchestrating the activity of several
Italian IDs. They selected and re-qualified ID subcontractors by promoting an upgrading of their 
competences and developing stable cooperative relations with them involving co-design as well as 
manufacturing.  Learning  through  relationship  with  a  lead  firm  helped  many subcontractors to
upgrade their technical and organizational competences and extend their potential market outside 
their ID.  Lead  firms  also  explored new  commercial  avenues and  invested in  R&D. Their  role 
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became  more  and  more relevant to  provide  IDs with  international  market  access,  strategic 
leadership, and resources.
5
In recent years some district lead firms experienced an accelerated internationalization process with 
the  establishment of  commercial  subsidiaries  and  production  facilities  abroad.  Now  these 
companies hold a dominant position in well-defined world-sized market niches – i.e., machine tools 
and other durable goods, clothing, luxury goods, and other branches of the so-called “Made in Italy”
– while at the same time maintaining deep roots in their ID of origin.
6
Unfortunately, existing literature lacks – with a few exceptions – in-depth studies of Italian district 
lead firms’ histories. This article aims to give a contribution to fill this gap by examining the case of 
one of  such lead firms: Wam,  a company set  up in 1968 in the mechanical-engineering ID of
Modena, which at the beginning of 21
th century had established itself as the world leader in the 
production of bulk material handling and dust filtration machinery. Drawing on Wam’s archive, 
interviews with Wam’s managers and a number of other sources, this article deals in particular with
the strategy of growth and internationalization that this company has pursued and its effects in both 
the host nations and the ID of origin.
1. The birth of the company and the acquisition of the competitive advantage
Wam was set up in 1968 as a owner-run company by Vainer Marchesini, at that time a 22-year-old 
technician who in 1965 had taken a diploma at Modena technical school and then had spent three 
years by working at Ime, a local concrete batching plant manufacturer.
7
In  the  beginning,  Wam  worked  with  only  three  employees in  a  garage  near Modena as  a 
subcontractor which produced cement screw conveyors for concrete batching plants.
8 At that time, 
the screw conveyor was a typical custom-built product. Every batching plant manufacturer had his
own trustworthy locksmith, to whom he ordered the screw conveyors he needed.  Every screw 
conveyor differed from the others in length, diameter, slope, burden, positioning of the inlet and 
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outlet spouts, and so on. Customers gave Wam a drawing of the screw conveyor that they ordered. 
Wam  in turn outsourced the production of nearly all the screw conveyor’s components to local 
subcontractors, usually locksmiths and very small mechanical-engineering firms. Within its own 
shop Wam ground the components that had been shipped by its subcontractors, assembled them and 
made the final testing of the screw conveyor.
9
From  1977  to  1980,  Wam undertook a  systematic  study  of  the cement screw  conveyor,  its 
components and applications. The aim was to find those configurations that could best improve the 
performance  and  functionality  of  the  screw  conveyor  and  lay  the foundation  for  standardized 
production. The result was a re-design and re-engineering of the product, that was now subdivided
into modules which could be standardized and combined together in a wide range of ways. As a 
consequence, product customization was maintained, but at the same time module standardization 
enabled the company to gain economies of scale and achieve a decisive competitive advantage over 
the artisans that produced the screw conveyor in a traditional way.
10
Besides,  Wam  developed and  constructed most of  the  production  equipment that  it needed  to 
manufacture the screw conveyors according to new product design, which at that time was not 
available on the market. 
Within a few years, the new modular product design was applied to other industries and modified 
according  to  their  requirements,  thereby  realizing those economies  of  scope that  come “from 
opportunities to  use  existing  production,  marketing,  and  research  facilities  and  personnel  by 
developing products for new and more profitable markets”.
11 After cement came asphalt industry, 
lime and plaster works, screw conveyors for dehydrated sludge, for animal feed and flour mills, 
screw feeders for the chemical, the food and the glass industry. Besides, butterfly valves, slide 
valves and dust filters were added to the product range.
12
The implementation of such a strategy enabled Wam to grow from seven employees in 1973 to 27 
in 1978 and to 59 in 1980. In the same year Wam became a joint-stock company.
13
2. From the Wam Company to the Wam group
In 1978 the Wam Company set up its first subsidiary – named Sp.Eco – to further realize economies 
of scope. Sp.Eco was localized near Wam’s headquarters and specialized in the production of solid-
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liquid separation equipment: screen presses, screw compactors, grid classifiers, concrete reclaimers 
and heavy-duty screw flightings. Since then Wam assumed a group structure.
14
In 1981 Wam was one of the first small-sized firms in Emilia-Romagna to create a R&D laboratory 
– named Srmp – specializing in both pure and applied research concerning powdery and granular 
materials, as well as the development of bulk solids handling and processing equipment.
In the 1980s, Wam established another three subsidiaries, all of them  localized inside Modena 
mechanical-engineering ID:  Map  (1983) for  the manufacturing  of industrial mixing  equipment; 
Analysis  (1986)  specialized  in weigh  belt  feeders production;  and Rotex  (1987)  that  produced
loading bellows, flexible helix conveyors and level monitoring equipment. 
At  the  head  of  these  subsidiaries  Marchesini  appointed  some  experienced  managers,  who  had
worked with  him at  Wam for  many  years. Each  of  these  individuals  was  given  a  minority 
shareholding in the subsidiary that he managed. Anyway, the parent-company Wam kept carrying 
out several functions essential to the subsidiaries’ activity, such as accountancy, personnel, sales 
and purchasing management.
15
Since the mid-1980s Wam added to this internal growth strategy, characterized by the creation of 
juridically  autonomous  companies  controlled  by the Wam Company itself,  an  external  growth 
strategy, with the acquisition of a few companies specialized in productions complementary to those 
of Wam. The aim was to have access to knowledge and competences relevant to Wam’s growth 
strategy and to broaden the Wam group’s product range. 
The  first  acquisition  occurred  in  1985,  when  Wam  took  over  Agritec of Modena,  a  company 
specialized in the production of agricultural and gardening equipment. However, because of poor 
economic  performance  Agritec was  reconverted  in  1991  to  the  manufacturing  of  bulk  solids 
discharging equipment.
16
In 1998 Wam acquired Oli of Milan, that produced vibrators. In the same year Oli was transfer to 
Modena next to Wam’s headquarters.
17
In 1999 Wam acquired Roncuzzi of Ravenna, a company founded in 1901 which specialized in the 
manufacturing of bucket elevators and chain and belt conveyors used to handle bulk material in 
ports. In the same year, another acquisition was Tecno Cm of Modena, a small firms specialized in 
the  production  of  components  in polyurethane,  which  for  a  few  years  had  been  working  as  a 
subcontractor for Wam.
18
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3. Wam as a district firm
Wam’s growth was undoubtely favored by the fact that the company was located inside an ID. The 
training of  the company’s founder followed  a  path common  to a whole generation  of Modena 
mechanical-engineering entrepreneurs. In fact, his training was characterized by an intermingling of 
formal skills learnt at the city’s technical school and of practical skills learnt on the job at Ime, and 
by a nurturing of technical and market competences concerning Ime’s business relationships which 
were favored by the fact that this company operated inside an ID.
19
Moreover, since its foundation Wam built a dense web of relationships with several firms inside the
Modena mechanical-engineering ID. We have seen that in the beginning Wam was little more than 
an assembler which outsourced nearly all the components of its screw conveyors. 
With  the  development  of  the  new  modular  product  design Wam  increased its  level  of  vertical 
integration and brought in-house most of the tubular bodywork manufacturing process. However, 
also in this new phase Wam kept relying on the local network of subcontractors. In fact, the screw 
conveyor is an artefact whose production requires both metal fabricating and machining operations. 
Wam specialized in the execution of a part of the former: cutting of pipe; openings for inlet and 
outlet spouts, as well as for inspection hatches; welding of flanges, spouts and hatches; bending and 
welding of the screws. Instead, Wam resorted to local subcontractors for the remaining part of metal 
fabricating (cutting, bending and welding of metal sheets) and all the machining (on reduction gears 
and intermediate and end bearings).
20
Thus, Wam, that in the late 1970s had opened a machining department where gears for the screw 
conveyor’s reducer were lathed and toothed, soon realized that it was more convenient to outsource
gear machining as well as the supply of all other components of the reducer to local subcontractors.
After a couple of years, the machining department was closed down and Wam decided to make in-
house only the assembly of the gear reducers.
21
4. The conquest of the domestic market’s leadership
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In 1981, Wam  had  already  established  itself  as  the market leader  in  Italy  for cement  screw 
conveyors with a share of about 40% (Table 1). Wam’s leadership was further strengthened in the
following decade and in 1991 its market share had risen to 60%. However, in 2000, it had decreased
to 50%, eroded by the competition of some small firms that had been founded by former Wam 
employees and had adopted the same modular product design originally developed by Wam. The 
production  volumes  of  these  competitors  were  much  lower  than  Wam’s  (the  largest of  them 
produced no more than 300 screw conveyors a year against 10,000 of Wam). Therefore, they could 
not realize the same scale economies as Wam, but also their overheads were lower. Nevertheless, in 
2003 Wam’s market share went up again to 55%. 
The conquest of the domestic market for dust filters was slower but more linear. Wam’s share for 
this product growth gradually from 20% in 1981 to 40% in 1991, 50% in 2000, and 60% in 2003.
In addition to cement screw conveyors and dust filters, that were the company’s more important 
products,
22 Wam  became the market leader  in Italy also for butterfly and slide  valves, mixers, 
vibrators, and other equipment.
23
5. The establishment of commercial subsidiaries abroad
The expansion on the domestic market was added, in 1977, by the first sales abroad, directed to 
France  and  West  Germany.
24 Since  then,  exports  grew rapidly and  were addressed towards a
increasing number of countries. Exports rose from 31% of the company’s turnover in 1981 to 52% 
in 1990 and to 63% in 1998.
25
In the mid-1980s Wam  decided  to establish commercial subsidiaries in those  foreign  countries 
whose markets were large or promising enough to justify such an investment.  The aim of this 
strategy was to develop a better knowledge of such markets, build stronger ties with local actors and 
provide customers with faster post-sale assistance. The first foreign subsidiary was Wam France, 
that was set up in 1984. Then other commercial subsidiaries followed in Germany (1986), UK
(1987), USA (1987), Denmark (1992), Japan (1994), Belgium (1995), Australia (1996), Thailand 
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(1996), India  (1998), Brazil (1999),  Holland (1999), Switzerland (1999), Finland  (2001), Chile 
(2003), Korea (2003) e Spain (2003).
26
This strategy enabled Wam to rapidly expand its sales in the European market, where it became the 
leader for both screw conveyors and dust filters (in this latter case with the exception of the UK).
As it is shown in Table 1, in 2000 Wam had a market share for screw conveyors of 70% in France 
and Germany and 60% in the UK, whilst the corresponding figures for dust filters were 50% in 
France, 20% in Germany and 10% in the UK.
The circumstance that market shares for screw conveyors were higher than those for dust filters was 
due to two fundamental reasons: 1) on the one hand, Wam started later to invest substantially in 
dust filters, only in the second half of the 1980s, after the Černobyl nuclear disaster had prompted 
greater attention to environment problems throughout the world; 2) on the other hand, to different 
nature of competition in the two sectors.
In fact, competition for screw conveyors was someway less tight, being constituted – both in Italy 
and abroad – by a multitude of very small firms whose technological and commercial capabilities 
were much inferior to Wam’s. On the contrary, the world markets for dust filters was characterized 
by stiffer oligopolistic competition. Here Wam faced a limited number of competitors, that were 
often larger in size and had a strong commercial organization: Dce and R-Master (UK), Infa-Staub 
and  Ats  (Germany),  Fda  (France),  Griffin and  Flex-Clean  (USA). Some products of  these
competitors  were technologically  superior  to Wam’s,  whose main  competitive  advantage  was 
constituted by lower production costs (and prices).
27
We have seen that since 1987 Wam set up commercial subsidiaries also in a number of extra-
European countries. However, contrary to what happened in Europe, such a move turned out to be 
largely ineffective to penetrate extra-European markets.
In the 1980s and 1990s the largest extra-European markets for bulk material handling and dust 
filtration machinery were the USA and Japan. Wam opened a commercial subsidiary in the USA in 
1987. However, at that time “nobody wanted our screw conveyors, even if we had gifted them. This 
occurred because no American batching plant manufacturer would have been available to wait eight 
weeks to be delivered a screw conveyor: the time we would have taken to manufacture it in Italy 
and transport it by sea to the USA”.
28 Besides, transport costs were very high and this made Wam 
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screw conveyors not competitive in terms of price in the American market.
29 Thus, Wam USA’s 
activity was limited to the commercialization of low volumes of filters (whose transport costs could
be reduced  by  shipping  these  products  semi-assembled), valves  and  other  fittings  for  batching 
plants.
30
Also Wam Japan (founded in 1994) focused on the commercialization of the two products that had 
lower transport cost: dust filters and valves. The selling of screw conveyors manufactured in Italy 
was not attempted either, for the same reasons as in the USA. The penetration of the Japanese 
market was nonetheless extremely difficult also for dust filters and valves. Wam’s market share has
always been very low: no more than 3% for filters and no more than 8% for valves. Wam products 
were more cost-effective, but their quality was lower than that of the Japanese products. And this 
amounted to a big competitive disadvantage as Japan was the most demanding market in the world
for quality. Moreover, Wam’s penetration in Japan was also hindered by cultural barriers and by the 
structure of the Japanese mechanical-engineering industry: “the Japanese market is very closed: 
many  of  our  potential clients  speak  only  Japanese  and  are  constituted  by companies  linked or 
belonging to the large keiretsu operating in that country, to which also our Japanese competitors are 
tied”.
31
6. The establishment of manufacturing subsidiaries abroad
Sales  in  extra-European  countries  soared  only  after Wam could  establish its  own production 
facilities there to serve those markets.
The first step in this respect took place in 1995 with the setting-up of Shanghai Wam – Wam’s 
subsidiary in the People’s Republic of China – that, differently from the company’s other foreign 
subsidiaries, operated  from  beginning  as  a  manufacturing  unit.  Such  a  choice  was someway
imposed by the Chinese authorities that were not interested in acquiring goods but know-how and 
see in this solution the way to have access to Wam’s technology.
32
In the beginning, the idea was to produce in China castings and other mechanical components to be 
shipped and assembled at Wam plant in Italy. Shanghai Wam was set up as a joint-venture with a 
Chinese partner. The parent-company Wam provided production equipment and training for the
Chinese personnel.
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Production started in 1996 and in January 1997 Shanghai Wam shipped its first components to the
Wam factory in Italy.
In March  1998 the Wam Company took full  control of Shanghai Wam.
33 Since then the main
strategic goal assigned to Shanghai Wam was changed too. Shanghai Wam would now have to 
operate not only as subcontractor for the Wam Company in Italy, but also and foremost as a firm 
producing finished goods – principally, cement screw conveyors and dust filters – for the Chinese 
market that in the 1990s had started to grow very fast.
34
Thus, in 1999 Shanghai Wam manufactured the first dust filters for the Chinese market, which were 
followed one year after by the first cement screw conveyors. By 2003 Wam had become the market 
leader in China for both products, with a share of 40% for cement screw conveyors and 20% for 
dust filters (Table 1).
In 1999 the Wam group set up another two joint-ventures in China. The first one was established by 
the  subsidiary Sp.Eco  for  the  production  of  water  screw  pumps and  screw  compactors  for the 
wastewater sludge purification plant of the Chinese city of Chengdu. The second one was instead 
established by  Wam’s  other  subsidiary  Oli in  Shangyu  for  the  production  of  components  of 
vibrating equipments. In this case the aim was outsourcing: vibrators were a standardized product 
and Wam realized it was convenient to resort to this newly-created joint-venture in China for the 
provision, at a much lower cost than in Italy, of most of their its (amounting to about 80% of the 
value of the finished product) while the final assembly was maintained in Italy.
35
In 1995 also Wam’s subsidiary in the United States started a manufacturing activity by installing an 
assembly line for round dust filters. Semi-assembled filter components kept coming from Italy. In 
1998 Wam USA moved from its originary location in Gainesville, FL, into new and larger premises 
in Lawrenceville, GA. Here the company constructed a new factory with warehouse facilities which 
produced screw conveyors and dust filters for the American market.
36
In 2002 Wam opened a second manufacturing unit in the United States, located in Fort Worth, TX. 
Since then, the Lawrenceville plant was specialized in the production of screw conveyors and dust 
filters according to the European standard Uni whose demand was growing very fast also in the 
United States. Conversely, the Fort Worth plant produced screw conveyors and filters according to 
the traditional North-American standard Cema (Conveyor Equipment Manufacturers Association).
37
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Undertaking production in loco enabled Wam to soon become the market leader in the United 
States for screw conveyors with a 40% share in 2003. Wam established its own presence also in the 
US market for dust filters, but with a share that in the same year amounted to only 10% (Table 1). 
In  2002  Wam  set  up  a  manufacturing  subsidiary  also  in Rumania  for  the  manufacturing  of 
mechanical components for screw conveyors and dust filters that are assembled in the Modena 
plant.
38 Lasty, in 2003 Wam established a manufacturing subsidiary in Croatia, which produced
bolted silos, an innovative product with respect to traditional welded silos. The goal was to supply 
the world market by relying on the Wam group’s commercial organization.
39
7. Some balance-sheet indexes of Wam performance
Balance sheets of the Wam Company (Wam group’s oldest and largest company) are available 
since 1981 (Table 3), while the Wam group’s consolidated balance sheets are available only since 
1997.
Tables  2,  3 and  4 report the numbers of employees  and some  selected balance  sheet data and 
indexes for both the Wam Company and the Wam group.
As in 1981 the Wam Company accounted for nearly all employees, turnover and assets of the Wam 
group, we can take the first as a proxy of the second for that year. Thus, we can observe that from 
1981  to  2003  employees  in  the  Wam  group  rose  by  14  times (from  68  to  967  employees). 
Conversely, in the same period the turnover increased, in real terms, by seven times (from 14 to 97 
million euro). The faster growth of employment as compared with turnover was principally due to 
an augment of the Wam group’s level of vertical integration, which will be dealt with in the next 
section.
The two profitability indexes (Roe and Roi) show some differences. Roi oscillates around 10% over 
the whole period considered. The lowest value (5.8%) was observed in 1993, when an international 
recession occurred, but only three years after it reached the apical value of 14%. The drop in 2003 
was mainly a consequence  of the revaluation of the euro.  In fact, this had the consequence  of 
reducing Wam’s profitability as the company decided not increase its sale prices outside the euro
zone not to loose market shares, despite factors of production were purchased mainly in Italy and 
therefore paid in euro.
40
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Roe shows wider oscillations than Roi. In particular, between 1982 and 1988 it exhibited very low 
values, never higher than 2%. As it is known, Roe reflects the result not only of a company’s 
production management but also of its financial management. The low value of Roe throughout 
most of the 1980s was a consequence of Wam’s high resorting to borrowed capital (see column 3 in 
Table 4) at a time when interest rates in Italy were very high, with the result that the satisfactory 
result of the production management  was eroded by financial expenses, whose weight on total 
turnover in the early 1980s was above 10%.
In the 1990s Wam reduced its reliance on borrowed capital and, at the same time, interest rates in 
Italy fell sharply. As a result, Roe showed higher values than in the previous decade, with a peak of 
27.4% in 1994. 
8. The introduction of automation at Wam plant in Italy
In the 1990s, Wam’s production rose from about 5,500 to 10,000 screw conveyors and from 2,000 
to 6,000 filters.
41 An important part in making this increase in production possible was played by 
the investments the company carried out in the automation of the Modena plant. The advent of 
automation in turns prompted a further increase in the company’s level of vertical integration.
We have seen that at the end of the 1980s Wam resorted to outsourcing for machining and metal 
fabricating  processing  on  metal  sheets.  At  the  beginning of  the  1990s,  the  availability of  new 
automating punching machines for metal sheet cutting pushed Wam to transfer these phase of the 
production  process in-house.  A new  production  department  was created for  it – named  “metal 
fabricating  department”  – and  placed  upstream of  the  production  cycle.  As  a  result,  in-house 
production  capacity  was  increased  with  the  realization  of  economies  of  scale  that  enabled  the 
company to have lower production costs.
42
Thus, in 1990 Wam acquired a combination plasma cutting punches, and a numerically controlled 
punching machine was purchased in 1992. In the three following years another three automatic 
machines  were  installed  in  the  metal  fabricating  department:  a  sheet  metal  welding  robot,  a 
numerically controlled folding machine and a laser cutting machine.
43 Between  1997 and 2000 
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42 As a Wam manager remembers, “the subcontracting artisan firms we relied on were to small to afford the investments 
necessary to introduce these new automatic machines. Therefore, we decided to transfer this processing in-house and 
purchased the most modern and efficient machinery available on the market.” (Mariuzzo, Interview, 28 March 2000).
43 Mariuzzo, Interview, 17 March 2000.13
another two laser cutting machines, two numerically controlled folding machines and three spinning 
lathes for cold forming of metal sheets were added.
44
The  introduction  of  automatic  machinery  and  the  ensuing  production  increase  in  the  metal 
fabricating department pushed Wam to expand the production capacity also  of the downstream 
departments: pipe and spout cutting and welding, painting, and assembly. Thus, in 1994 a robot for 
plasma cutting and welding of screw conveyors was installed in the welding department, which was 
followed in 1995 by a numerically controlled grooving machine for inlet and outlet spouts. Another 
two robots for  plasma  cutting and  welding of  screw  conveyors were  added  between  1998 and 
2000.
45
The introduction of robots in the welding department was a troublesome event because at that time 
there were no  robots  available  on  the  market that had  been  designed  to cut  and weld  screw 
conveyors. Thus, “we searched among 6-7 robot distributors and saw which robot could best suit 
our needs. We eventually chose a Motoman robot. Three of our staff went to their distributor in 
Modena to attend a training course to learn how to programme and use this robot. At the same time, 
we brought with us some pieces of screw conveyor that were used to develop a software which 
enabled that robot to actually cut and weld screw conveyors. That software was developed by them 
according to the needs expressed by Wam.”
46
In 2000 Wam introduced also a painting robot, while the final assembly still remained a very labor 
intensive task. However, this was speeded up by the fact that for every component a computer 
releases all the documents necessary for production management.
47
Moreover, a  small  machining  department  was  created  in  2001  after  Wam  took  over the Lgm
Company, one of its major suppliers of mechanical components within the Modena ID.
48
The  advent  of  automation  was  accompanied  by  an  increased  attention  to  the  quality  standard 
standards. In 1994 the Wam Company received the Uni-En-Iso 9001 quality certification for the 
procedures that it had adopted internally.
49
In  the  1990s  Wam  also  made  an  intense  effort  for personnel  training  in  order  to enable its 
employees to properly use the new computer-aided process technology and comply with the Uni-
En-Iso quality procedures. This led, in 1997, the Wam Company and the labor unions to sign and 
agreement that established a training programme which would involve all employees. These would 
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48 Archivio Wam, VCA, 2 October 2001.
49 Archivio Wam, Stefania Medici, Manuale assicurazione qualità, (mimeo, 1995): 1.14
have been provided a monetary incentive to attend.
50 The organization of the courses were entrusted 
to a specialized training centre, certified by the regional government of Emilia-Romagna: Ial of 
Carpi, controlled by the Catholic union Cisl.
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9. The configurator
By the end of the 1990s, the most sophisticated application of ICT at Wam was represented by the 
configurator: a software capable of configuring a product (screw conveyor, valve, filter, and other)
by following the user’s answers to a succession of questions put by the computer.
The first configurators appeared on the market in the 1970s to serve the demand of very large 
customers. Between the late 1980s and early 1990s Wam also tried to introduce a configuartor. 
However, that project failed. That failure was due to the fact that Wam developed a software in 
which  the  drawing  configurator  was  cabled  inside  a  programming  language.  This  architecture 
required a dedicated programme for each of the products included in the sales catalogue. However, 
such a solution could not meet the needs of Wam, which at that time was small and had a very 
diversified product range.
Thus, that project was soon abandoned and after a few years and Wam began to look for a different 
way of developing a configurator. On that purpose, in the mid-1990s Wam started a collaboration 
with software house in the neighboring town of Reggio Emilia and with Democenter, one of the real 
service  centres  set  up by the regional  government  of Emilia-Romagna,  which  was  located  in 
Modena.
52
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This collaboration led in a few years to the development of a new configurator targeted on Wam’s 
needs. The major novelty was that this new software functioned within an operating system which 
did not need to be re-programmed for each product that had to be configured. Thus, the company’s 
engineering  staff  could  now  easily  insert  in  the  configurator  the  specifications  of  all  products 
included in the sales catalogue which constituted the database that had to be used by the commercial 
department in the management of orders. This platform could be installed on a personal computer 
and enabled its user to configure nearly all Wam products and accessories without the need to write 
an ad hoc programme for each of them.
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10. R&D and innovation
As we have seen, in 1981 Wam was one of the first mechanical-engineering companies in Emilia-
Romagna to set up a R&D laboratory. Since then, Wam invested in the average 2% of its annual 
turnover in R&D. The company developed both pure and applied research and participated at a 
number of international research programmes funded by the European Union. For that purpose, 
Wam often partnered with the universities of Bologna and of Modena and Reggio Emilia.
54
At  the  beginning of  the  21
st century Wam’s  R&D laboratory  had  a  staff  of  about  ten  people. 
Research concerned in particular:
1. Studies regarding the behaviour of granular materials when being conveyed or mixed;
2. Interaction of bulk solids with container and conveyor casing materials;
3. Studies  regarding  innovative  construction  materials  for  the  manufacture  of  equipment 
components for screw conveyors, dust filters, industrial mixers, flow intercepting valves, 
and others.
4. Studies regarding new technologies and production processes for the manufacture of screw 
conveyors, dust filters, industrial mixers, flow intercepting valves, and others.
55
Over the course of time, the activities of the R&D laboratory led to the registration of numerous 
Italian and international patents.
56
11. Wam Inc. (USA) at the beginning of the 21
st century
                                                
53 Marco Bortolamasi (Wam’s Technical Manager), Interview, 27 June 2000.
54 Marchesini, Fare impresa.
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The lay-out of Wam’s two manufacturing plants in the United States resembled that of the Wam 
Company’s plant in Italy. However, there were some differences concerning the levels of vertical 
integration and, above all, the type of production equipment installed.
The two  factories  in  the  United  States were  largely  equipped  with  the  machinery  that  was 
dismantled from the Modena plant to make room for  the new computer-aided machines in the 
1990s.
In the  Lawrenceville plant (the oldest of  the two), differently from  Modena, there is neither a 
machining  department,  as  electric  motors and  gear  reducers must  comply  with  the  US  Nema 
standards and are purchased from North-American suppliers, nor a metal fabricating department, as 
sheet metal cutting, folding and welding are also outsourced to North-American subcontractors.
The production cycle in Lawrenceville starts with the cutting and welding of pipe, which are carried 
out with a plasma MIG system which was used in the Modena plant before robot installation. 
Moreover, in the welding department there are some positioners that assure pipe alignment with the 
end bearing supports which are of the same type as those used in Modena. 
Then, once the inlet and outlet spouts have been welded to the pipe, the product is sandblasted and 
painted. Differently from the Modena plant, painting in Lawrenceville is not robot-aided, but is 
carried out directly by the operator with a pain spray gun.
Lastly, the screw conveyor passes to the final assembly. Also in this department there is a difference 
with respect to Modena. In fact, in Modena the body of the screw conveyor is hung to a chain 
conveyor and the components are assembled to it as this moves forward. Instead, in Lawrenceville 
the body of the screw conveyor is placed on a trolley which is pushed forward directly by the 
operators once the components have been installed. Such a system lengthen by about one quarter 
the time needed to assemble a screw conveyor.
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Lastly, in Lawrenceville there is also a dust filter department, which mostly assembles components 
that are outsourced to North-American subcontractors. In this department there is also a plasma 
punching machine, which produces a part of the sheet metal panels for the body of the filters, while 
the remaining panels are purchased by local suppliers.
The organization of the Forth Worth plant is similar to the Lawrenceville one. Thus, there are no 
computer-aided machines in  Wam’s  North-American  plants and,  more  generally, production
equipment is less sophisticated than in the Modena plant. Such a circumstance can be explained by 
the size and the production runs of the two US plants, that are too small to make an investment in 
costly and sophisticated production equipment convenient. In fact, in 2003 the Lawrenceville plant 
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had a covered surface of 4,000 square meters and 18 employees, while the Fort Worth plant had a
covered surface of 8,400 square meters and 26 employees. Their overall production was only 1,000 
screw conveyors and 1,500 filters. Conversely, in the same year the Modena plant had a covered
surface  of  70,000  square  meters, more  than  300  employees and  produced  about  10,000  screw 
conveyors and 8,000 filters to serve Europe, Northern Africa and the Middle East.
58
Wam’s headquarters in Modena provided technical support for the optimization of the organization 
of  the  production  cycle  in  the  two  North-American  plants,  as  well  as  for  the  development  of 
products and production equipment tailored to the needs of the US market.
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As we have seen, by 2003 Wam had succeeded to become the market leader for cement screw 
conveyors in the United States with a share of 40% and also held a 10% market share for dust 
filters. This  achievement  was  the  result  of  a  fully-fledged  strategy  aimed  at  capturing  the  US 
market. In fact, to be present in the United States with its own production facilities would not have 
sufficient to Wam to conquer the market leadership in that country as American customers pay a 
great attention not only to product quality, quality-price ratio and delivery time, but also to service 
and post-sale assistance and also to the product image.
In this respect, Wam USA decided first of all not to appear as the local branch of a foreign parent-
company but as an American company. On that purpose in the year 2000 Wam’s subsidiary in the 
United  States  was renamed Wam  Inc. and applied  for  membership  of the  American  Conveyor 
Equipment Manufacturers Association.
60
Besides, to promote its products Wam Inc. started to regularly participate at the four main fair trade
in the building and construction industry in America, held in Atlanta, Chicago, Las Vegas and 
Orlando. The  technical  department  and  communication  center  of  Wam’s headquarters  in  Italy 
backed up the sales and marketing department of Wam Inc. in the preparation and management of 
Wam’s showcases in these events.
But,  above  all,  to  capture the  American  market Wam needed  to  create,  around  its  two 
manufacturing  plants  of  Lawrenceville  and  Fort  Worth,  a ramified network  of  agents  and 
representatives  that  assured  quick  post-sale  assistance  and  spare  parts  delivery  throughout  the
immense territory  of  that continent.  By 2003  such  an assistance network numbered  45  service 
points in the United States and eight service points in Canada.
61
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12. Shanghai Wam at the beginning of the 21
st century
The lay-out of the Shanghai Wam’s  plant in turns resembled that of the Modena and the US plants, 
even if some major differences existed. Also the Shanghai plant was largely equipped with the 
machinery that was dismantled from the Modena plant after  the introduction of the new computer-
aided machines in the 1990s.
In Shanghai, differently from both Modena and Lawrenceville, upstream there is a large machining 
department, which produces mechanical components. This existed since 1995, but it was much 
enlarged in 2001 after Wam took over the Lgm Company, one of its major suppliers of mechanical
components  within  the  Modena  ID in  Italy. After  the  takeover,  most  of the Lgm Company’s 
machines  tools  (numerically  controlled  lathes,  mills,  drills,  and  small  machining  centres)  were 
transferred  to  the  Shanghai Wam’s plant,  while  the  remainder  was  transferred  to  the Wam 
Company’s  plant  in Modena  where  a  small  machining  department  was  established  too. Thus, 
custom-built  or  short-run mechanical  components – for  prototypes  and products  that  are 
manufactured in small batches – are produced in-house in Modena or outsourced to subcontractors 
in Italy, while long-run components are produced in the machining department of the Shanghai 
plant, that purchases castings directly from Chinese foundries.
In the Shanghai plant, next to the machining department there is a department where machined 
components are sub-assembled to make gear reducers, supports and end bearings. These products
are partly shipped to Italy and partly assembled in loco in the screw conveyors produced for the 
Chinese market.
Then, there is the section of the Shanghai plant where the tubolar bodywork of the screw conveyor
undergoes its manufacturing process. Here, similarly to Lawrenceville but differently from Modena, 
there  is  not  a  metal  fabricating  department  for  sheet  metal  cutting,  folding  and  welding.  The 
production cycle starts with the cutting and welding of pipe and spouts. There is also a department 
where the spirals are folded and welded as well as departments for the painting and final assembly
of the screw conveyors, which are similar to those in Lawrenceville.
Lastly,  in  Shanghai  there  is  a  dust  filters  department,  which,  differently  from  the  analogous 
departments in Modena and Lawrenceville, is exclusively an assembly department as all sheet metal 
panels of the body of the filters are purchased from Chinese subcontractors.
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In 2003 the Shanghai plant had a covered surface of 10,000 square meters and 165 employees who 
worked on three shifts.
63 In that year production amounted to about 2,000 screw conveyors and as 
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many  dust  filters.
64 Wages  were  about  ten  times  lower  than  in  Italy  and  therefore  it  was  not 
surprising that the production technology was more labor-intensive than in Modena.
65
However, this implied that the performance of Shanghai Wam  relied even more on the human 
factor. Therefore the company paid a particular attention to employee training, which took place 
partly in Modena and partly in China.
66
A great care was devoted to improve the quality of the procedures adopted within the company. In 
this respect, Shanghai Wam started introducing the Uni-En-Iso 9000:2000 quality system in 2003.
67
To achieve  this goal, at the end  of 2003 the company launched  the “Continuous  improvement 
programmes” at which all employees were encouraged to participate. Within this framework, four 
“Continuous improvement project teams” were established:
1. “Warehouse control team”, to decrease stock volume and speed up stock rotation and reduce 
cost;
2. “Screw conveyor quality improvement team”, to decrease the screw conveyor’s rework and 
defect rate during the production process;
3. “Training system upgrade team”, to optimize company training system and to obtain an 
average of 30 hours’ employee training per year;
4. “Vfs-100-Tn  valve  quality  improvement  team”,  to  improve  the  quality  of  valves  and 
customer satisfaction on this specific item.
Besides, all employees were encouraged to set up quality control teams spontaneously. Monetary 
and spiritual awards would have been awarded to quality control team achievements, i.e.: bonuses 
and wage increases, public praise and “yearly star employees” nomination.
68
Furthermore,  to  encourage  more  and  more  employees  to  exert  their  wisdom  and  potentials, 
Shanghai Wam enacted the “Innovation award” policy: 10% of the cost saved or profits made out of 
the said innovation within one year after the innovation was proved and adopted would be awarded 
to the innovator, and administrative praise would be recorded in the employee’s file.
69
As a result, In May 2004 Shanghai Wam received the Uni-En-Iso 9000:2000 quality certification by 
the German Authentication Institute Tüv.
70
But, above all, to conquer the leadership of the Chinese market Shanghai Wam had to invest in its 
sales and marketing organization. To upgrade the professionalism of the sales force the company 
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organized several training courses for its sales staff in cooperation with Cegos, the largest enterprise 
management consulting company in Europe.
71
To  promote  its  products  Shanghai  Wam  started since  2002 to  regularly  participate  at  the 
“International Powder/Bulk Conference & Exhibition” held in Shanghai, the most influential event 
in this sector in China. The technical department and communication center of Wam’s headquarters 
in Italy backed up the Shanghai Wam to prepare and manage its showcase at this trade fair.
72
Besides, to better serve the regions of China that are far away from Shanghai, in 2003 the company 
opened up sales offices in Chengdu, Guang-Zhou and Beijing.
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13. Conclusions
This article has shown that at the basis of Wam’s success there was the competitive advantage that
the company acquired in the late 1970s through the re-design and re-engineering of the cement 
screw conveyor. As a result, the screw conveyor was transformed from a custom-built product to a
product  constituted  by several  standardized modules  that could be combined  in many different 
ways.  In  such  a  way,  product  customization was  maintained but,  at  the  same  time,  module 
standardization  enabled  the  company to  realize  economies  of  scale  that  gave  it  a  decisive 
competitive advantage over its competitors. 
Successive growth has occurred by pursuing a “deep niche” strategy typical of many small firms 
that have succeeded in becoming international players: that is, by finding and creating new markets 
where there were no large rivals so that such firms could become leaders while remaining relatively 
“small” in  size.
74 Thus,  Wam  applied the modular product  design  originally conceived  for the
cement screw conveyor to other bulk solids handling and processing equipment and dust filters,
thereby realizing economies of scope as well as economies of scale.
The growth of the company was made possible by the Chandlerian three-pronged investment in 
production facilities large enough to exploit a technology’s potential economies of scale and scope, 
in  a  national  and  international  marketing  and  distribution  network,  and  in  management.
75
Eventually, it was the latter – the investment in organizational capabilities – that turned out to be the 
more important, by  enabling  the  company to  manage and  coordinate  a network  of  nearly  30 
commercial and manufacturing affiliates – using mainly proprietary technology – spanned across 
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four continents. These are supported by the R&D and engineering departments located at Wam’s
headquarters in Modena.
A comparison between Wam’s factories in Italy, China and the United States has shown that these 
produce the same goods (screw conveyors and dust filters) but differ each from the other as regards 
both their  level  of  vertical  integration  and  the  type  of production  equipment  installed.  Such  a 
circumstance seems to confirm that there is not only one way – or a one best way – to organize a 
production process. The same product can be made in many different ways. And which of these will 
be preferred does not depend on qualities that are intrinsic in technology, but on other factors, such 
as the size of the market, customers’ preferences with regard to the quality-price ratio, the level of 
competition, the existence of a network of qualified sub-sucontractors, the role of institutions, and 
the relative prices of factors of production.
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A prominent scholar has observed that by going abroad a company does not simply finance an 
affiliate in a foreign country but transfers over borders an entire business package that includes 
products,  processes,  experience,  reputation,  knowledge  of  where  and  how  to  find  financing, 
marketing  know-how  and  networks,  trade  marks,  technology,  research  and  development 
background,  information,  and  managerial  expertise. Moreover,  the  establishment  of  a  foreign 
affiliate triggers “spill-over” effects in the host country that must be considered as well. These 
include  the  development  of  supplier  and  dealer  networks  that  are  not  internalized  within  the 
multinational enterprise as well as the training of employees that leave the multinational enterprise 
to go to other firms, thus disseminating skills. A spill-over effect occurs also when a multinational 
introduces  a  new  product in  a  country:  domestic  businesses  see  possibilities  in  copying  and 
producing the same products.
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This article has shown that Wam’s internationalization process triggered many of these effects. This 
was particularly the case in the United States and China, where the company established not only a 
commercial  subsidiary,  but  also  its  own  production  facilities. In  both  countries  Wam  created 
subcontracting networks that in many respects resembled those typical of its Italian ID of origin. 
Wam transferred to its American and Chinese subcontractors its technical knowledge to enhance the 
quality of their products so that they could meet Wam’s standards. Moreover, Wam’s headquarters 
in Italy backed up its US and Chinese subsidiaries by training their personnel and transferring to 
them its technology, trade-marks, sales and marketing know-how, organizational procedures, and 
managerial expertise. By doing so Wam developed some of those “new pragmatic disciplines” of 
“learning  by  monitoring” which  transform  tacit  knowledge  into  “pidgin  formalizations”  and 
facilitate cooperation and information exchange across organizational and geographical boundaries.
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As recent scholarship has observed, these make IDs less self-contained and more integrated into 
global supply chains and knowledge exchange networks and have been one of the most important 
evolutions in successful IDs.
78
Conversely, the Modena plant saw since the late 1970s a progressive increase in the level of vertical 
integration which made it less dependent on its traditional manufacturing subcontractors located 
inside the Modena mechanical-engineering ID. At the same time – and especially since the 1990s –
Wam developed new asset-augmenting relations with a web of other actors operating within its 
Italian ID of origin, which over the course of time became more and more important to the whole 
Wam group’s success, such as specialized subcontractors that manufacture customized and short-
run components, suppliers  of  automatic  machinery  and  sophisticated  production  equipment, 
software houses, real service centres, vocational training centres, and local universities.
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TABLES
Table 1 – Wam’s market shares in some selected countries
Cement screw conveyors Circular dust filters
Italy France Germany UK Usa Japan China Italy France Germany UK Usa Japan China
1981 40% 40% 20% 40% - - - 20% 10% 5% - - - -
1991 60% 60% 50% 60% - - - 40% 30% 10% 10% - - -
2000 50% 70% 70% 60% 10% - - 50% 50% 20% 10% 10% 3% -
2003 55% 70% 70% 60% 40% - 40% 60% 60% 20% 20% 10% 3% 20%
Source: Data provided by William Fantini (Wam’s General Manager) on 30 April 2004. 
Table 2 – Employees at Wam




























Source: Archivio Wam, Relazioni del Consiglio di Amministrazione e dei Sindaci (1980-2003).24











1981 13,917 8.2 13.7 3.9 10.7
1982 12,717 2.0 12.4 3.5 12.1
1983 10,781 1.3 10.1 4.3 12.1
1984 9,943 1.5 9.1 4.4 10.6
1985 10,540 1.7 13.9 4.4 9.9
1986 11,398 1.2 10.8 5.0 7.0
1987 12,423 0.9 9.8 5.1 8.9
1988 15,077 0.2 10.0 7.6 7.6
1989 20,041 11.5 9.7 7.7 6.7
1990 16,506 15.6 12.1 6.2 6.7
1991 18,424 7.2 10.9 4.5 6.2
1992 21,335 1.7 11.4 5.5 5.8
1993 20,420 6.0 5.8 5.3 6.7
1994 23,141 27.4 8.3 4.7 4.6
1995 30,578 26.0 11.5 5.3 4.9
1996 31,206 19.8 14.0 4.7 4.8
1997 33,861 19.2 11.0 4.9 3.9
1998 34,598 8.7 12.0 3.9 4.7
1999 36,637 10.4 7.7 3.8 2.9
2000 41,233 10.8 6.7 3.2 2.4
2001 48,854 15.3 11.1 3.1 2.6
2002 52,374 11.6 13,4 3.2 2.6
2003 51,292 11.6 6,3 3.0 2.3
Source: Archivio Wam, Bilanci annuali (1980-2003).
(1) Thousands of euro (2003)
(2) Net profit / capital owned x 100
(3) Operating profit / invested capital x 100
(4) Invested capital / shareholder’s equity











1997 58,869 25.4 10.4 6.0 3.7
1998 61,847 21.3 10.1 4.7 3.8
1999 68,728 22.8 10.8 4.0 2.1
2000 82,637 16.2 7.7 3.9 1.9
2001 94,986 18.4 10.7 3.7 2.3
2002 92,717 24.0 8.5 3.6 3.1
2003 96,906 11.3 5.2 3.2 3.2
Source: Archivio Wam, Bilanci consolidati (1997-2003).
(1) Thousands of euro (2003)
(2) Net profit / capital owned x 100
(3) Operating profit / invested capital x 100
(4) Invested capital / shareholder’s equity25
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